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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is properly before this Court pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in granting the Christiansen' Motion to 
Compel Farmers' Responses to Requests for Admissions and Requests for 
Production? 
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying Farmers' Motion to Stay the 
Bad Faith Action? 
Except for a difference in the standard of review, the issues above are the same 
as those listed by Farmers under Issues Presented for Review in its original Petition for 
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, page 4. Such are the issues which this 
Court specifically agreed to address when it granted Farmers' Petition for Permission 
to Appeal Interlocutory Order on December 10, 2003. 
Perhaps in an effort to avoid the "abuse of discretion" standard of review 
discussed in detail hereafter, Farmers has chosen in its Brief on Appeal to modify the 
issues that it originally presented for review, which issues formed the basis for this 
Court's Order granting the Petition for Permission to Pursue Interlocutory Appeal in 
the first place. 
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The Christiansens request that this Court consider addressing the permitted 
issues as originally presented for review. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
compel discovery is the "abuse of discretion" standard (Archeleta v. Hughes* 969 P.2d 
409, 414 (UT 1998); and Roundv v. Stalev. 984 P.2d 404 (UT App. 99)). Indeed, trial 
courts have broad discretion in matters of discovery, and an appellate court will not 
find an abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no 
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling (Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (UT 
1996)). 
As to the second issue of whether the Trial Court properly denied Defendant 
Farmers' Motion for Stay, determination of the appropriate standard of review is more 
complicated. The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for stay is controlled, 
in part, by § 78-3la-108(7) Utah Code Annotated, which states as follows: 
"If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any 
judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a 
claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay 
to that claim." (Emphasis added.) 
A trial court's interpretation of a statute is generally "reviewed for correctness" 
(as in Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc.* 15 P.3d 1030 (UT 2000)). 
However, built into this particular statute is an express grant of discretion to the trial 
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court. Specifically, "the court may limit the stay to that claim [i.e., the claim being 
arbitrated]." That is precisely the way the Trial Court exercised its discretion in this 
case, - it limited the stay to the UIM claim which was diverted into arbitration. In 
severing the claims and limiting the stay to the UIM claim in arbitration, the Trial 
Court specifically referenced the statutory grant of discretion in its Minute Entry ("the 
court is afforded discretion in the statute . ...") (R. 174). 
Where a trial court is expressly vested with discretion, the appropriate point on 
the standard of review spectrum should fall closer to an "abuse of discretion" standard 
than to "de novo" review or "review for correctness". This conclusion is stressed in 
the in-depth standard of review tutorial provided by this Court in the case of State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (UT 1994), wherein the Court explained: "At this point, we must 
attempt to determine when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a set of facts - - a 
rule that we establish without deference to the trial courts - - embodies a de facto grant 
of discretion which permits the trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions 
about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal" (Italics 
added.) 
Simply put, a statutory grant of discretion to the trial court favors use of the 
"abuse of discretion" standard of review. This principle was followed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Lund v. Brown* 11 P.3d 277 (UT 2000), where the high 
court reviewed a trial court's exercise of discretion afforded by Rule 60(b) Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure, in refusing to vacate a default judgment. Although the Justices 
cautioned that the Trial Court's discretion is not unlimited, the Lund Court concluded, 
"We review the Trial Court's decision in the instant case for abuse of discretion". 
While Plaintiffs' agree with the Court's observation in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932 (UT 1994) that the answer to the standard of review question is not always black 
and white, Plaintiffs' urge this Court to acknowledge the discretion afforded trial 
courts in the Arbitration/Severance/Stay of Claims Statute and, accordingly, apply 
something approaching the "abuse of discretion" standard of review to the Trial 
Court's decision to limit the Stay to the UIM claim in arbitration. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The issues presented on appeal were preserved by Defendant's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Feiith and Associated 
Causes; Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Request for a 
Protective Order pursuant to Rule 26(c) (R. 117-127)' and Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. 177-178, 180-199). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 78-3la-108(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms 
shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a 
claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-31a-108, enacted by L. 2002, ch. 326 § 8. Effective dates. 
Laws 2002, ch 326, § 34 makes the act effective on May 15, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case: This is a first-party breach of contract lawsuit filed by Byron 
and Merrilee Christiansen against their own auto insurance carrier, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange. 
In their Complaint, the Christiansen's stated two separate causes of action that 
are relevant to this appeal. The first was an action to enforce Farmers' contractual 
obligation to pay underinsured motorist (hereinafter "UIM") benefits to the 
Christiansens pursuant to the written provisions of the policy, in return for the 
Christiansens' payment of insurance premiums. That first claim stems from injuries 
Mr. Christiansen sustained when he was rear ended by an underinsured motorist on 
May 10, 2001. Farmers' obligation as to this first claim arose when the other driver's 
insurance company tendered inadequate liability policy limits, and the Christiansens 
filed a claim under their own Farmers UIM coverage for the remaining damages. 
Farmers failed to pay the UIM claim, or to even take a position as to the claim, which 
forced this cause of action to collect the Christiansens' UIM benefits. 
The Christiansens' Second Cause of Action is for Farmers' first-party breach of 
implied contractual duties; namely, Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith 
And Fair Dealing. As alleged, such duties include, "among others, duties to diligently 
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investigate the facts to determine if their claims are valid, duties to fairly evaluate their 
claims, duties to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling their claims, 
duties to avoid conflicts of interest, and duties to refrain from actions which would 
injure Byron or Merrilee Christiansens' ability to promptly obtain appropriate UIM 
compensation" (R. 5). 
The Christiansens1 Second Cause of Action includes allegations that Farmers 
breached its good faith, implied contractual duties to the Christiansens, as well as 
allegations that Farmers instituted and followed, "a general bad faith business practice 
of compelling its own insureds to institute litigation or arbitration before granting 
reasonable settlement authority, or any dollar settlement authority, thereby deliberately 
delaying fair and equitable settlement of first-party claims in which liability is 
reasonably clear" (R. 6). 
Relative to the Christiansens' second claim for breach of these implied, good 
faith duties, Farmers provided sworn Responses to Requests for Admissions wherein 
Farmers admitted to the liability of the adverse driver, and further admitted that 1) 
Farmers never communicated any denial of the Christiansens' UIM claim; 2) Farmers 
never communicated any settlement authority in connection with the Christiansens' 
UIM claim; and 3) Farmers never joined in any settlement negotiations in connection 
with the Christiansens' UIM claim (R. 212-214). Consequently, this case has never 
involved a true dispute as to the value of the claim because in the 16 months from the 
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time the Christiansen's claim was presented, until the arbitrator awarded benefits, 
Farmers never took a position on whether the claim was payable, and if so, in what 
amount. 
Both of the Christiansens' causes of action are for breach of first-party insurer 
contractual duties. In order to avoid confusion, the Christiansens will hereinafter refer 
to their first claim as a cause of action for "breach of written contract", and to their 
second claim as a cause of action for "breach of implied contract". 
Course Of Proceedings: Upon receiving Plaintiffs' Complaint, Farmers filed its 
Answer and a jury demand. A Scheduling Order was agreed upon and entered by the 
Court. Both parties commenced discovery, with Farmers sending out sixteen Notices 
of Records Depositions, and the Christiansens serving ten Requests for Admissions, 
one Interrogatory, and ten Requests for Production of Documents, including a request 
for a certified copy of the Christiansens' Farmers Insurance Policy. Within one week 
of seeing the Christiansens' discovery requests (responses to which the Christiansens 
eventually moved to compel), Farmers filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay 
the Christiansens' causes of action. After receiving from Farmers a copy of the 
Christiansens' policy, and reviewing the arbitration provision, the Christiansens agreed 
to stipulate to arbitration of their breach of written contract claim, but maintained their 
opposition to arbitration and stay of their breach of implied contract claim, which was 
outside the scope of the contractual arbitration provision (R. 99 - 116). Meanwhile, 
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Farmers filed a Motion for Protective Order relative to the Christiansens' discovery 
requests, which requests related to both causes of action. 
Disposition In The Court Below: The Trial Court granted the Christiansens' Motion 
to Compel Farmers' Responses to Requests for Admissions, and Farmers filed 
Supplemental Responses to the Requests for Admissions. The Court reserved its 
ruling on Farmers' Motion for Protective Order in connection with the Requests for 
Production of Documents until later, when Farmers provided the Court with a copy of 
those requests (at which time Farmers' Motion for Protective Order was denied, except 
as to Request for Production 10). Additionally, the Court relied on the Severance 
Statute at Utah Code Annotated § 78-3la-108(7) to sever the UIM claim from the 
litigation and into arbitration, and to limit the Stay to the UIM claim in arbitration, 
allowing the claim for breach of implied contract to proceed in District Court. 
Farmers then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Court denied that. 
Meanwhile Farmers had filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order 
Compelling Discovery and Denying Farmers' Motion to Stay the Action for Breach of 
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Since that Motion was still 
pending before the Supreme Court, Farmers requested that the Trial Court stay its 
above-described Orders until an Order was received from the Supreme Court on the 
pending Petition. The Court denied that request. Farmers then filed a Motion for 
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Expedited Stay with the Utah Supreme Court, which was granted, pending a decision 
on the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. 
The parties arbitrated the Christiansens' breach of written contract claim, 
resulting in Arbitrator Scott Daniels' December 8, 2003 award to the Christiansens of 
$74,867.50 in UIM benefits. Two days later, without notice of the arbitration award, 
the Utah Supreme Court granted Farmers' Petition for Permission to Appeal the 
Interlocutory Orders. Given the interim Arbitration Award, the Christiansens' filed a 
Motion to Set Aside Permission to Appeal the Interlocutory Orders based on mootness 
resulting from the change in circumstances, which motion was denied. 
Statement Of The Facts: On May 10, 2001, Byron Christiansen was injured in a 
clear liability rear end motor vehicle accident. Within one week of the accident, Mr. 
Christiansen was examined by neurosurgeon John Sanders, who scheduled Mr. 
Christiansen for accident-related anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with plating 
at C4-5 to be performed on June 6, 2001. After obtaining a second opinion from 
neurosurgeon J. Charles Rich, Mr. Christiansen opted to try to postpone the surgery, or 
hopefully avoid it all together, by pursuing conservative treatment (R. 64-65). 
The adverse driver's auto insurer, State Farm, tendered its $50,000.00 liability 
policy limits within 30 days of receiving Mr. Christiansen's June 25, 2002 settlement 
demand package (R. 61-69). Within a week of the tender, the Christiansens' own auto 
insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, consented to the liability policy limits settlement 
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and waived no-fault subrogation as to the $3,000.00 in medical payments and 
$4,750.00 in lost wages it had advanced (R. 71), thereby acknowledging that the value 
of Mr. Christiansen's damages exceeded the $50,000.00 liability policy limits by at 
least $7,750.00. 
On August 19, 2002, the Christiansens sent Farmers their $100,000.00 UIM 
policy limits settlement demand package. They enclosed all of the same accident-
related medical records, reports and bills that had triggered State Farm's prompt 
tender, including Dr. Rich's future neck surgery cost estimates (R. 73, 74). On 
October 24, 2002, Farmers (through attorney Michael Hansen) requested Mr. 
Christiansen's tax returns for the last five years, Mr. Christiansen's sworn statement, 
and documentation of Mr. Christiansen's participation in pre-accident racquetball 
tournaments (R. 76). Within one week thereafter, Mr. Christiansen gave his sworn 
statement, provided his tax returns, and provided the documentation of his racquetball 
tournaments before the accident (R. 78, 80). During Mr. Christiansen's November 1, 
2002 sworn statement, Farmers requested all of Mr. Christiansen's radiological films. 
The films were copied and provided to Farmers on November 12, 2002, with a letter, 
once again, asking for Farmers' position on the UIM claim (R. 82). On November 25, 
2002, Mr. Christiansen sent Farmers an updated medical report from his primary 
physician documenting his ongoing care. In the cover letter to that report, Mr. 
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Christiansen once again asked Farmers for its position concerning the UIM claim (R. 
85, 86). 
In a December 26, 2002 letter to Farmers, Mr. Christiansen reviewed his 
compliance with all of Farmers' requests for additional information. Mr. Christiansen 
reminded Farmers that a reasonable time for a reply to his UIM claim had passed, and 
Mr. Christiansen warned Farmers that in the absence of a responsible reply within a 
reasonable time, Mr. Christiansen would file a lawsuit against Farmers for his UIM 
benefits and for breach of Farmers implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in 
accordance with Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange* 701 P.2d 795 (UT 1985) (R. 
88,89). Still no reply. 
On February 28, 2003 (six and one-half months after the UIM claim was 
presented), Farmers requested a list of all of Mr. Christiansen's pre-accident doctors. 
Mr. Christiansen provided the requested list to Farmers on March 11, 2003 (R. 92-93). 
Although it is not yet a matter of record on appeal, Mr. Christiansen's production of 
the list did not trigger any medical record requests by Farmers. 
After waiting in vain for nearly eight months for Farmers to take a position on 
their UIM claim, the Christiansens filed suit in Third District Court on 
April 11, 2003. At the time suit was filed, no requests for additional information were 
pending. Farmers had made no requests for additional information during the 30 days 
prior to filing. 
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Fourteen months after the Christiansens submitted their UIM claim to Farmers, 
in Farmers' October 15, 2003 Supplemental Responses to Requests for Admissions, 
Farmers claimed it still had, "insufficient information to determine the liability of 
others involved in the accident"; and "insufficient information to make an evaluation 
as to Plaintiffs entitlement to underinsured motorist benefits." (R. 213.) 
During the 16 month pendency of the Christiansens' UIM claim their health 
insurance was cancelled for non-payment because they could no longer afford the 
premiums (R. 240, p 20). 
Because of the loss of the Christiansen's health insurance, and because Dr. Rich 
required payment of his surgeon's fee "up front" before performing the surgery, Dr. 
Rich's fee was paid entirely from the December 8, 2003 Arbitration Award, and Byron 
Christiansen finally underwent neck surgery on December 19, 2003, over two and one-
half years after it was originally scheduled. 
For the facts concerning the Course of Proceedings, and the Disposition in the 
Court Below, please refer to those subheadings in the preceding pages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court's November 2003 Stay pending resolution of the Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal effectively resolved the issues on appeal by postponing the bad 
faith proceedings just long enough for the arbitration to conclude. The questions 
1? 
presented for interlocutory review are now moot. For purposes of this case, it no 
longer matters whether the Trial Court was correct. 
Farmers agrees that the Arbitration Award satisfied any alleged need for the 
Christiansens to demonstrate "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits before proceeding 
further in the bad faith litigation (See Farmers' Brief, pages 39, 40, 49). Likewise, the 
final resolution of the arbitration removed any potential for discovery in one side of 
the case to prejudice the other. Farmers' Supplemental Responses to Requests for 
Admissions compelled by the Trial Court did not affect the arbitration. Nor has 
Farmers claimed any such effect. Now that the arbitration is over, the only claim 
remaining is that before the Trial Court for breach of implied, good faith duties. 
Resuming appropriate discovery by lifting this Court's Stay of the Trial Court's Order 
denying Farmers' Motion for Protective Order no longer has any arguable potential to 
prejudice the arbitration. The Stay served its purpose and should now be lifted. No 
further analysis is needed, as far as this case is concerned. 
On the other hand, should this Court decide to use this as an opportunity to 
provide further clarification and direction to others facing similar circumstances and 
issues in the future, the balance of the Christiansens' Brief will be devoted to those 
issues. 
The Christiansens' First Cause of Action for Breach of the Written Contract, 
and the Christiansens' Second Cause of Action for Farmers' Breach of the Implied 
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Contract are two separate and independent causes of action, either one of which may 
stand alone on its own, in the absence of the other (Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (UT 1985)). 
Inspite of Beck, Farmers argues that the Christiansens' claim for breach of the 
implied good faith covenant is not a separate and independent cause of action, and 
may not stand on its own. Specifically, Farmers argues that the courts must 
superimpose "legal entitlement" and "breach of written contract"' showings (which 
relate to the insurance policy and the UIM statute), on top of the requisite "breach of 
implied contract" factors outlined in Beck, in order for the Christiansens to pursue the 
breach of implied contract claim. 
Farmers has failed to produce Utah caselaw involving a cause of action for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith wherein a court held "legal entitlement" 
and/or "breach of the written contract" to be prerequisites to pursuit of the breach of 
implied contract claim. Nor has counsel for the Christiansens been able to find any 
such legal authority. In the absence of such authority, Farmers has resorted to reliance 
on two groups of cases, which are simply not on point. The first is a group of Utah 
cases including Lyon v. Hartford, Lima v. Chambers, Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance, Chatterton v. Walker, Leiber v. ITT Hartford Insurance, and Estate of 
Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance, none of which involved any cause of action for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, such breach of 
written contract cases cannot offer legitimate support to Farmers5 argument that such 
cases establish "legal entitlement" and "breach of written contract" prerequisites to 
maintenance of any cause of action for breach of implied contract. 
The second group of cases on which Farmers' relies are "legal entitlement" 
cases from other states where no Beck remedy exists, even to this day. Some of those 
other states recognize statutory bad faith causes of action. Some of them recognize 
bad faith tort causes of action. But none of them recognize the Beck breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing remedy controlling in Utah. Consequently, 
cases from outside Utah are simply not very helpful in determining how and when the 
Beck remedy applies. 
Farmers also argues that the Beck case itself supports a required showing of 
"legal entitlement" and "breach of written contract" before pursuit of a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Importantly, however, the term "legal 
entitlement" is never mentioned, much less established as a prerequisite, in the Beck 
opinion. 
In Point IV of Farmers' Brief on Appeal, Farmers argues that, despite the 
Christiansens' $75,000.00 award in the breach of written UIM contract claim that they 
arbitrated, the Christiansens are still precluded from resuming pursuit of their bad faith 
claim because a) the UIM claim was "fairly debatable"; and b) Farmers' breach of the 
implied duties of good faith resulted in no real damages to the Christiansens. 
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As will be explained hereafter in further detail, the "fairly debatable" defense 
presumes both parties took opposing positions. Farmers never did. By its own 
admission, Farmers never took a position. That failure at once serves to disqualify 
Farmers from maintaining the "fairly debatable" defense, while at the same time 
constituting an independent and actionable breach of its implied good faith duties. 
As to damages, they have been properly alleged. For purposes of this appeal, 
that is all that is necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
HAVING SERVED ITS PURPOSE, THE STAY OF THE CHRISTIANSENS' 
CLAIM FOR FARMERS5 BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT SHOULD BE 
LIFTED, AND DISCOVERY SHOULD PROCEED AS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT I: The Issues On Appeal Are Moot. 
It is undisputed that the Christiansens were found to be "legally entitled" to 
UIM benefits in arbitration (see Satisfaction of Arbitration Award dated December 15, 
2003, Farmers' Addendum Al). At the bottom of page 31 of Farmers' Brief on 
Appeal, it stated, "Inasmuch as the arbitration award issued after this Court granted 
Defendant's Petition to Appeal Interlocutory Order established Plaintiffs' "legal 
entitlement' to UIM benefits, . . .." Still referring to this case, Farmers again 
acknowledged on page 49 of its Brief on Appeal, "Similarly, in this case, the insurance 
company promptly paid the benefits owing once a finding of "legal entitlement" to the 
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UIM benefits was made by the arbitrator, . . .." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, for 
purposes of this appeal, legal entitlement is a moot point regardless of whether it is 
deemed to be an additional pre-requisite to pursuit of a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as Farmers argues. 
Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in compelling Farmers Responses 
to Requests For Admissions is also a moot question, since Farmers did supplement its 
Responses, and the Responses did not affect the arbitration. This conclusion is 
supported by the case of Chatterton v. Walker\ 938 P.2d 255 (UT 1997). This was an 
uninsured motorist case in which State Farm Insurance intervened to protect its own 
interests under the UIM policy. State Farm appealed the District Court's entry of 
default against Walker on the issue of liability, and also claimed error in the District 
Court's refusal to grant a protective order shielding State Farm from answering certain 
interrogatories. State Farm promptly moved to Stay that Order pending its Petition For 
Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Concurrently, State Farm provided 
answers to most of the interrogatories. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded as 
follows: "To the degree State Farm has fully responded to the interrogatories, its 
appeal with respect to them is now moot." (Id., at 260.) 
In the instant case, Farmers' Motion For Protective Order was dated July 23, 
2003 (R. 128-9). The Trial Court's Order compelling Farmers' Responses to Requests 
For Admissions was dated October 3, 2003 (R. 174-5). Farmers dated its 
17 
supplemental admissions October 15, 2003. Concurrently, Farmers filed its Petition 
For Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order on October 16, 2003. 
Given the similar discovery and motion pattern, and the fact that Farmers 
already supplemented its Responses, the Chatterton rationale supports the 
Christiansens' position that whether the Trial Court's discovery order was an abuse of 
discretion is now a moot question. 
POINT II; Farmers' Theory Is Contrary To Beck v. Farmers. 
Although the Christiansens' legal entitlement to UIM benefits is no longer in 
dispute, prior to the Arbitration Award, Farmers based its Petition for Permission to 
File Interlocutory Appeal on the theory that, in order to proceed on their cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the 
Christiansens should first be required to prove "legal entitlement'' to UIM benefits, 
and breach of written contract. For the reasons explained below, this theory is directly 
contrary to controlling law in the landmark case of Beck v. Farmers Insurance, 701 
P2.d 795 (UT 1995). 
The Christiansens' First Cause of Action for Farmers' breach of the written 
UIM contract is governed by a) the language of the written contract (policy) itself, and 
b) by Utah's UIM statute, § 31A-22-305(9)(a). The Christiansens already prevailed on 
that claim. The Arbitration Award was satisfied, and the Christiansens' claim for 
breach of written UIM contract no longer exists. 
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The Christiansens' Second Cause of Action for Farmers' breach of the implied 
contract (the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) is governed neither by the policy 
language, nor by the UIM statute. Rather, it is governed by Utah common law 
established by this Court in the case of Beck v. Farmers {Id.) 
Prior to Beck, Utah insureds had no remedy against their insurers when they 
refused to bargain or settle in good faith with their insureds. (See Lyon v. Hartford, 
480 P.2d 739 (UT 1971)). In this regard, the Beck court stated as follows: 
"Our ruling in Lyon left an insured without any effective remedy against 
an insurer that refuses to bargain or settle in good faith with the insured. 
An insured who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a 
marked disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment for 
that loss . . . the temptation for an insurer to delay settlement while 
pressures build on the insured is great, especially if the insurer's 
exposure cannot exceed the policy limits. (Citations omitted.) In light 
of these considerations, we now conclude that an insured should be 
provided with a remedy . . . we hold that the good faith duty to bargain 
or settle under an insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts and that a violation of 
that duty gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. In addition, we do 
not adopt the limitations suggested by Farmers [that a plaintiff must 
produce evidence of bad faith wholly apart from the 'mere failure' to 
bargain or settle] but hold that the refusal to bargain or settle, 
standing alone, may, under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient 
to prove a breach." (Id.) (Insert added for clarification. Emphasis also 
added.) 
The Beck Court continued, "We therefore hold that in a first-party relationship 
between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual". 
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In summarizing its newly created breach of implied contract cause of action, the 
Beck Court stated as follows: 
"We conclude that the implied obligation of good faith performance 
contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate 
the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly 
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim. (Cites omitted.) The duty of good faith 
also requires the insurer to 'deal with laymen as laymen and not as 
experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting' and to refrain from 
actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the 
contract (cites omitted). These performances are the essence of what the 
insured has bargained and paid for, and the insurer has the obligation to 
perform them. When an insurer has breached this duty, it is liable for 
damages suffered in consequence of that breach." (Id.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Beck remedy detailed above is precisely the one alleged in the 
Christiansens' Second Cause of Action (R. 5, 6). 
As is clear from the above excerpts, the Beck remedy was created in response to 
Farmers' refusal to bargain in good faith with its Utah insureds, and was designed to be 
entirely independent of any written contractual or statutory causes of action. 
The now moot dispute that triggered this Interlocutory Appeal stemmed from 
Farmers' renewed, but familiar, attempt to erect artificial, arbitrary barriers to recovery 
for its breach of good faith duties owed to its own insureds. The showings of "legally 
entitled" and "breach of written contract" which Farmers argues are pre-requisites to a 
Beck cause of action, arise out of the insurance policy and the UIM statute, and have 
never been identified as pre-requisites to the Beck remedy. Indeed, the term "legally 
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entitled" does not appear in the Beck opinion. Nor is that term mentioned in Chatterton 
v. Walker, 938 P.2d 225 (UT 1997), on which Farmers relies so heavily. Indeed, 
Farmers claims, on page 9 of its Brief on Appeal, as follows: "The court in Chatterton 
refused to allow discovery in a potential bad faith claim absent first showing that 
plaintiff was 'legally entitled' to benefits alleged under the insurance contract." In 
reality, not only is "legally entitled" never mentioned in the opinion, but importantly 
there was no bad faith cause of action in Chatterton. Consequently, the Court held that 
discovery requests intended to explore the mere possibility of a bad faith claim were 
irrelevant, and therefore not discoverable. Although Farmers would have this Court 
believe that Chatterton dicta overruled the hold in Beck, the basis for the Chatterton 
holding was irrelevance, not legal entitlement. 
Moreover, Farmers has failed to cite any Utah cases involving a cause of action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where a court has 
applied the barriers Farmers recommends. Nor has counsel for the Christiansens found 
any such case authority. 
In its Brief on Appeal, Farmers cites five Utah "legally entitled" cases which it 
claims support its argument that the Christiansens are required to prove "legal 
entitlement" to contractual UIM benefits before they may proceed on the breach of 
implied contract allegations (Lyon v. Hartford, 480 P.2d 739 (UT 1971)(overruled on 
other grounds by Beck, supra); Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (UT 1982); Peterson 
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v. Utah Farm Bureau, 927 P.2d 192 (UT 1996); Estate ofBerkemeir v, Hartford, 67 
P3.d 1012 (UT AV 2003); and Chatterton v. Walker. 938 P.2d 255 (UT 1997). 
Interestingly, and importantly, none of these five Utah cases involve any formal bad 
faith allegations or any cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. Consequently, none of the dicta cited by Farmers from these five 
written breach of contract cases is helpful relative to the Christiansens' cause of action 
for breach of implied contract. Certainly these five cases do nothing to alter the explicit 
holding in Beck that a failure to bargain or settle may be actionable standing alone. No 
Utah court has ever imposed "legally entitled" or "breach of written contract" pre-
requisites on a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
as Farmers now asks this Court to do. 
Farmers, in its Brief on Appeal, also places undo reliance on "legally entitled" 
bad faith cases from other states where no Beck remedy has ever been recognized. 
When it fashioned the Beck remedy, this Court acknowledged that, "this position has 
not been widely adopted by other courts", and "we recognize that a majority of states 
permit an insurer to institute a tort action against an insurer who fails to bargain in good 
faith in a 'first party' situation . . .." (Beck, Id.) Most of the many cases cited by 
Farmers in Points II and III of its Brief on Appeal, come from states that follow the tort 
approach to bad faith. The rest of the cases cited by Farmers come from jurisdictions 
that approach bad faith as a statutory cause of action. But none of the out-of-state cases 
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cited by Farmers comes from a jurisdiction that recognizes the Beck breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing remedy which controls in Utah. Consequently, 
cases from outside Utah are simply not very helpful in determining how and when the 
Beck remedy applies. 
In support of its argument that the Trial Court erred in allowing discovery to 
proceed in the breach of implied contract case before the conclusion of the breach of 
written contract case in arbitration, Farmers also mistakenly relies on two other 
distinguishable groups of cases. The first group of cases, all from other jurisdictions, 
involves causes of action for UIM / UM claims coupled with bad faith claims. In 
those cases, those courts refused to allow/compel production of discovery pertaining to 
offers of settlement and compromise. Such cases are not helpful to the issues in the 
Christiansens' case, since Farmers never made any offer of settlement to the 
Christiansens. Indeed, that refusal to join in negotiations is the breach at the center of 
the Christiansens' remaining cause of action. 
In the second group of out-of-state cases relied upon by Farmers, the courts 
prevented bad faith claims from proceeding until coverage had been established. In 
the Christiansens' case, coverage has never been an issue. Thus, neither group of 
cases is very helpful or persuasive. 
Despite clear language in the opinion to the contrary, as reviewed above, 
Farmers also argues that the Beck case itself supports a preliminary showing of legal 
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entitlement. In its Brief on Appeal, Farmers goes so far as to argue that Beck says, 
"that an insured could not bring an action for bad faith against his or her insurer, until 
a breach of that contract was established" (p. 20), and that, "It is clear that the insureds 
may not simply file a bad faith claim without having first established that they are 
"legally entitled" to the contract benefits and, second, that the insurance company 
breached the contract." (p. 21) Yet, that is precisely what Beck did, with the Utah 
Supreme Court's after-the-fact approval. 
As noted earlier, the term "legally entitled" is never used in the Beck opinion, 
much less established as a pre-requisite. Farmers nevertheless argues that such pre-
requisite was established by implication based on "the context of the claimant in that 
case having already been determined to be 'legally entitled' to uninsured motorist 
benefits . . .." (Farmers' Brief on Appeal, page 17.) Contrary to Farmers' description 
of the Beck context, careful reading of the opinion confirms that Beck raised and 
pursued the breach of written contract and the breach of implied contract claims 
simultaneously, just like the Christiansens. Indeed, in Beck, discovery was open and 
underway in the absence of any stay for two months after the Court bifurcated the 
claims, until the UIM claim settled. Comparably, in the Christiansens' case it was two 
and one-half months between the time their claims were severed, and the date of the 
Arbitration Award. The fact that the Trial Court in Beck did not stay the bad faith 
claim when it bifurcated it from the UIM claim conclusively refutes Farmers' 
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argument that Beck supports the "legally entitled" pre-requisite and Farmers' claim 
that the Trial Court erred when it severed the Christiansens' claims without staying the 
bad faith litigation. 
The above point was further driven home when in Beck, like in the 
Christiansens case, Farmers tried to argue that for Beck to sustain a bad faith claim, he 
must produce evidence "wholly apart from the 'mere failure' to bargain or settle". The 
Beck Court answered as follows: "We do not adopt the limitations suggested by 
Farmers, but hold that the refusal to bargain or settle, standing alone, may, under 
appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to prove a breach." In short, Farmers' 
theory on appeal is directly contrary to Beck. 
POINT III: Under Beck, Farmers Must Promptly Communicate Its UIM Claim 
Valuation. 
Farmers' argues that it was prejudicial for the Trial Court to grant the 
Christiansens' Motion to Compel and to deny Farmers' Motion for Protective Order 
relative to discovery requests aimed at Farmers' valuation of the Christiansens' UIM 
claim, because such information could be used to Farmers' disadvantage in the severed 
arbitration of the UIM benefits claim. Farmers' notion demonstrates a fundamental 
lack of understanding of the Beck covenant of good faith and fair dealing. According 
to Beck. "The implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the very 
least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine 
25 
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim," (Emphasis added.) (Citations 
omitted.) The Supreme Court added that the first-party insurer is "to refrain from 
actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract/9 
(Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) Indeed, the Court concluded that, "These 
performances are the very essence of what the insured has bargained and paid for and 
the insurer has the obligation to perform them." {Beck* Id.). 
It stands to reason from the above excerpts in Beck, that it cannot be prejudicial 
to Farmers to have to disclose its valuation of its insured's UIM claim, when Farmers 
has a good faith implied duty to do so promptly in the first place. Otherwise, by 
hiding its valuation of the UIM claim from its insured, and by stalling communication 
of that valuation to the insured, Farmers would be in breach of its duties to 1) fairly 
evaluate the claim and thereafter act promptly in rejecting or settling it; and 2) to 
refrain from actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the 
contract. Indeed, according to Beck, such disclosure in the form of a timely, good faith 
offer (or denial) is the essence of what the insured has bargained and paid for. 
Therefore, when the Trial Court granted the Christiansens' Motion to Compel 
Farmers' Responses to Requests for Admissions (and later Farmers' Reponses to 
Requests for Production) and denied Farmers' Motion for Protective Order, the long-
overdue disclosure of Farmers' UIM valuation (which has still not been disclosed) 
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could not be prejudicial. To protect Farmers from disclosing information evidencing 
its valuation of the UIM claim would be to further Farmers' breach of its Beck good 
faith duties. The undisputed fact on which this conclusion turns is that from August 
19, 2002 when the Christiansens presented their UIM settlement demand, until the 
moment notice of the Arbitration Award was received sixteen months later on 
December 10, 2003, Farmers never communicated to the Christiansens its position on 
their UIM claim (despite repeated written requests from the Christiansens that it do 
so). 
POINT IV: "Beck" And The Definition Of "Legally Entitled" Can Be 
Reconciled. 
The meaning of "legally entitled" has fluctuated a lot since it was addressed for 
the first time by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Lyon v. Hartford (Id.). And the 
definition stills bears refinement in order to be reconcilable with the duties of good 
faith and fair dealing outlined in Beck. 
Lyon was an uninsured motorist breach of written contract case filed after the 
injured passenger had already obtained a verdict against his own driver and two other 
at-fault drivers, one of which was uninsured. The Lyon Court used the "legally 
entitled" language in a UM policy as a tool to help calculate the time when interest on 
the judgment against the tortfeasor began accruing. Under the circumstances of that 
case, and for the purpose of calculating interest on the award, the Lyon Court 
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concluded that the claimant became "legally entitled" to recover damages (and 
interest) as of the date judgment was rendered against the tortfeasors. Given this 
background, if Lyon gave birth to the "legally entitled" defense asserted by Farmers in 
this case, it was a very shaky, partial, unintended birth at best. 
The Utah Supreme Court next addressed the meaning of "legally entitled" in the 
Lima v. Chambers case 657 P.2d 279 (UT 1982). In Lima, the Court held that an 
uninsured motorist carrier may be allowed to intervene as of right in the underlying 
tort action against the uninsured motorist in order to raise defenses bearing upon the 
extent of the UM carrier's exposure. After citing the "legally entitled to recover 
damages" language from Utah's UM statute, the Lima Court reasoned, in dicta, as 
follows: "Thus, if an insured is injured by an uninsured motorist, the insured may 
recover damages from his own insurance company upon showing that he is "legally 
entitled" to recover those damages from the uninsured tortfeasor. This showing of 
legal entitlement typically entails a lawsuit against the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate 
the issues of liability and damages. A judgment favorable to the insured fixes the 
insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that judgment, within the policy limits." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Of course, UM/UIM coverages and claims have evolved a lot since Lima was 
decided in 1982. For instance, the Lima comment that it typically takes a lawsuit to 
determine legal entitlement is no longer true, given the prevalence of arbitration 
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clauses in UM/UIM policy provisions. Nowadays, instead of suing the 
uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor, and having the UM/UIM carrier intervene, the 
UM/UIM insured and the UM/UIM insurer simply arbitrate, absent interim settlement. 
Nevertheless, Lima transformed the definition of "legal entitlement" from a mere 
marker of time when interest began accruing, into a statutorily recognized showing 
evidenced by a favorable judgment against the uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor. 
Basically, the Lima Court used "legal entitlement" as a tool to show that a tort action 
has a direct effect on an insurer's statutory and contractual duty to pay UM benefits, 
thereby justifying a right of direct intervention. Importantly, "legal entitlement" was 
not yet used to mean a prerequisite to collection of UM/UIM benefits. 
The next step in the evolution of the definition of "legally entitled" was in the 
Utah Court of Appeals case entitled Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau, 927 P.2d 192 
(1996). Peterson was a passenger in a truck owned and operated by a co-employee 
within the scope of his employment. The co-employee driver fell asleep, there was an 
accident, the driver was killed, and Peterson was severely injured. After applying for, 
and receiving Workers Compensation benefits, Peterson filed a UIM claim with his 
own insurer. Relying on the Lyon and Lima language discussed previously, Utah Farm 
Bureau successfully defended the UIM claim by arguing that the Exclusive Remedy 
provision of the Workers Compensation Act prevented Peterson from pursuing a 
viable claim "that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law" against the 
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estate of his co-employee. Such was the context of the following language from the 
Peterson opinion: "We hold that Farm Bureau's 'obligation to perform, under the 
express terms of its contract with . . . [Peterson, does] not arise until their . . . [is] a 
legal determination of the liability of the [under-] insured motorist and the extent of 
the damages sustained,' (citation omitted), and that a judgment favorable to Peterson is 
necessary to fix Farm Bureau's contractual duty to satisfy that judgment. The 
Workers' Compensation Act prevents Peterson from satisfying this requirement." In 
context then, the Peterson Court used "legal entitlement" as a tool to enforce the 
Exclusive Remedy provision. Importantly, it was not defined to mean that an insurer 
could avoid responding to a UIM claim, with no duty to deny the claim or negotiate 
until the UIM insured produced a judgment. Nevertheless, that is precisely what 
Farmers has represented the Peterson case to stand for in Farmers' Brief on Appeal 
(page 15). 
In The Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance Company, 67 P.3d 1012 (UT 
App. 2003), Hartford Insurance used the above language from Peterson to argue that 
the estate of its insured was not "legally entitled" to UIM benefits because the insured 
died before obtaining an arbitration award. In Berkemeir, Hartford Insurance 
conceded that Ms. Berkemeir's damages exceeded the underinsured motorist's liability 
coverage; but Hartford disputed the amount of Berkemeir ys UIM claim. 
Unfortunately, before the UIM arbitration could be concluded, Berkemeir died of 
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causes unrelated to the accident. Hartford argued that the Peterson language 
controlled, and that absent a legal determination of Berkemeir's damages, Hartford 
was under no contractual duty concerning Berkemeir's claim either before or after her 
death. 
Retreating from the Peterson language, the Berkemeir Court held that "to 
qualify under the iegally entitled to recover' language of a UIM contract, a party is 
not required to establish that a legal determination has been made." Rather the 
Berkemeir Court clarified, "a party is 'legally entitled to recover' if they can show the 
existence of a Viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment." Applying this 
relaxed standard, the Berkemeir Court stated: 
"Here Hartford accepted from the outset the fact that Alexander 
caused the accident that resulted in Berkemeir's injuries. Hartford, 
without objection, allowed Berkemeir to enter into a settlement and 
release with Alexander and his insurance company for the limits of his 
policy. Then, when Berkemeir approached Hartford and submitted a 
demand under the terms of her UIM policy, Hartford conceded that her 
injures exceeded the limits of Alexander's policy. To determine the 
amount due, the parties, under the terms of Berkemeir's policy, entered 
into arbitration. We conclude that Hartford's concessions concerning 
Alexander's liability and its concession that Berkemeirys damages 
exceeded Alexander's policy limits, as well as its reliance on language 
from Berkemeir's insurance contract relating to arbitration, qualify as a 
settlement 'that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law'. 
Thus, by its own actions, Hartford acknowledged its duty under the 
contract concerning Berkemeir's UIM claim." 
The Berkemeir opinion was filed in March of 2003. 
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It is critical to note that if the Berkemeir Court had adopted the definition of 
"legally entitled" argued by Farmers in the present interlocutory appeal, the Estate of 
Berkemeir would have received nothing from Hartford. Additionally, Farmers' 
description of the Berkemeir case (on page 16 of its Brief on Appeal) is incorrect in 
several respects. Specifically, it was the adverse driver's insurer that settled and paid 
the liability policy limits, and it was Hartford Insurance that acknowledged that the 
plaintiffs damages exceeded the liability coverage and consented to the underlying 
settlement. 
As demonstrated by the preceding review of the evolution of the definition of 
"legally entitled" in Utah over the past 25 years, the Utah courts have never defined 
"legally entitled" in a way that would excuse a UIM insurer from its implied, good 
faith Beck duties. However, the variety of different contexts in which the court has 
defined "legally entitled" has left room for confusion and misapplication of some of 
the language in Utah's "legally entitled" cases. In order to mininme further confusion 
and misunderstanding, the Christiansens' propose that the Court refine the definition 
of "legally entitled" to mean that a UM/UIM insured becomes "legally entitled" to 
recover UM/UIM damages when the UM/UIM insurer's timely, good faith claims 
evaluation shows the benefits to be owing; not just when the insured can produce a 
legal determination in the form of an arbitration award or judgment, and not just when 
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the insurer acknowledges its duty under the contract by its outward conduct (as in 
Berkemeir). 
Since no public policy interest is served by allowing an insurer to breach its 
Beck implied contractual duties and postpone payment of UIM benefits (to the ongoing 
detriment of its insureds), when the insurer's own valuation already shows such 
benefits to be owing, this refinement/reconciliation works to no one's disadvantage. It 
merely holds the first-party insurer to its own good faith determination, rather than 
putting the insured to the delay and burden of having to either 1) settle short; 2) obtain 
an arbitration award; or 3) obtain a judgment, before the insured can proceed on a 
cause of action for the insurer's bad faith breach of implied contract. Furthermore, in 
the absence of a timely, good faith claims evaluation by the insurer (as in the 
Christiansens' case), "legally entitled" should not be construed to further the insurer's 
bad faith non-disclosure, delay and refusal to negotiate, by in effect, staying discovery 
of the insurer's own overdue UIM benefit valuation. This is true regardless of 
concurrent arbitration of a written breach of UIM contract claim. 
POINT V: Farmers' Bad Faith Breaches Are Not "Fairly Debatable", And They 
Greatly Damaged The Christiansens, And Others Like Them. 
While the amount of the Christiansens' UIM claim may have been fairly 
debatable, Farmers' breaches of the implied duties of good faith are not. The fact that 
Farmers' never denied the Christiansens' UIM claim, that Farmers never made an 
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offer of settlement; that Farmers never joined in negotiations; and that Farmers' failed 
to promptly investigate and evaluate the Christiansens' UIM claim is not "fairly 
debatable". Indeed, Farmers has admitted to such breaches as a matter of record in 
sworn Responses to the Christiansens' Requests for Admissions (R. 212,213,214 and 
215). Farmers correctly argues on page 34 of its Brief on Appeal that, "An insurance 
company is not required to pay every claim submitted to it". However, as the Court 
taught us in Beck, there is no "fairly debatable" basis for never responding to a first-
party claim. 
Relative to the Christiansen's ability to prove real damages flowing from 
Farmers' breach of its implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, it is important to 
understand that what Farmers did to the Christiansens' is actually more egregious than 
what Farmers did to the claimant in Beck. At least in Beck, Farmers' took a position 
by promptly (albeit arbitrarily) rejecting Beck's claim. With the Christiansen's, the 
lack of a denial from Farmers kept leading the Christiansens to believe that Farmers 
would eventually join in good faith negotiations, maybe after the Christiansens 
supplemented the mountain of medical records, reports and bills already provided with 
a little bit more documentation. But despite the Christiansens repeatedly and promptly 
supplementing their claims information with whatever Farmers asked for, Farmers 
never did take a position. It never did bargain. It never negotiated. It never even 
rejected the claims outright, which would have at least saved the Christiansen's eight 
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months (the time wasted waiting for a reply, before filing suit) of financial hardship, 
saved them from losing their family's health insurance for inability to continue to 
afford the premiums, preserved their good credit rating from ruin, and enabled Mr. 
Christiansen to afford to have his surgery eight months sooner, saving him eight 
months of pain and suffering. Such are precisely the kinds of general and 
consequential damages for which the Beck Court fashioned a remedy. Moreover, the 
Christiansens have alleged that Farmers was not only doing this to them, but that 
Farmers had instituted, and was following, a deliberate policy of stonewalling its Utah 
UIM claimants generally. Such damages, together with the attorneys' fees incurred as 
a result of Farmers' bad faith breaches, are real, and are properly alleged. Besides, 
whether Farmers' bad faith breaches were "fairly debatable" and whether the 
Christiansens will be successful in proving the damages suffered due to Farmers' bad 
faith breaches are considerably outside the scope of the limited issues presented for 
review in this interlocutory appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts, arguments and legal authorities, the 
Christiansens respectfully request the Court to either 1) declare the issues presented for 
interlocutory appeal to be moot, or 2) affirm the Trial Court's Orders by finding that it 
did not abuse its discretion in compelling discovery, denying the protective order and 
denying the motion to stay breach of implied contract action. In either event, the 
35 
Christiansens ask that this case be remanded to the Trial Court, that the Stay be lifted, 
and that the proceedings below be allowed to continue where they left off. 
Should the Court decide to use this case as an opportunity to provide further 
clarification and guidance on the issues discussed herein, the Christiansens request that 
the Court hold that "legally entitled" and "breach of written contract" are not 
prerequisites to an action for breach of the Beck implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
Further, the Christiansens request that the Court refine the definition of "legally 
entitled" to mean that a first-party insured becomes "legally entitled" to UM/UIM 
benefits when the UM/UIM insurer's own timely, good failh claim valuation 
determines an amount of benefits to be owing; and that in the absence of a timely, 
good faith communication of the insurer's value determination to the insured, 
discovery of such value determination in a resulting bad faith action shall not be 
deemed prejudicial to the insurer's interests in any concurrent arbitration of the 
UM/UIM claim. This would reconcile "legally entitled to recover" language found in 
Utah's UM/UIM statute and most auto insurance policies, with the Beck covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. This proposed solution would also allow a trial court to 
retain discretion to stay whatever claims it deems appropriale pursuant to the 
Severance Statute, after considering the nature of discovery sought and the 
circumstances of each particular case. For example, the courts would still be fully 
empowered to order the discretionary stay of any bad faith claim that might appear to 
have been filed along with a UIM claim solely for the purpose of obtaining access to 
the insurer's files. This should minimize Farmers' concerns in that regard. 
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